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A ny inquiry into the em ergence o f  "civil society" in post-M ao China is 
bedevilled both by ambiguity o f the term "civil society" itself and the com plexity o f  the 
historical process it is used to describe. This problem  extends far beyond the Chinese 
case, since the idea o f  "civil society" has been em braced by a broad spectrum o f  
ideological persuasions and used to analyse a wide variety o f  countries in what used to 
be called the First, Second and Third W orlds. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
theorists o f  the right and left have argued for the crucial importance o f  "civil society" as 
a force for protecting social cohesion against the ravages o f  market forces or providing 
the organisational basis for an alternative form o f  democratic governance to the 
traditional bureaucratic state. 1 In Central and Eastern Europe, it was the experience o f  
political struggle against comm unist regimes which gave "civil society" the enhanced 
currency it has enjoyed over the past decade and a half, particularly the experience o f 
Solidarity in Poland.2 In the developing world, many countries have been undergoing 
program m es o f  econom ic liberalisation which has led to discussion about the inter­
relationships betw een (spreading) markets, (retreating) states and (em erging) civil 
society and their implications for the "Third W ave" o f  democratisation in the region.3
These discussions can help to throw light on the Chinese case. As a com m unist 
country undergoing social changes and political stresses, there is a clear resonance with 
Eastern European experience. As a developing country undergoing radical econom ic 
liberalisation and a redefinition o f  the character and role o f  the state, there is shared 
experience with other developing countries. Given the roots o f  the idea o f  "civil 
society" in W estern experience, however, its utility in explaining processes elsewhere 
has proven patchy. China's distinctive historical trajectory and social character should 
prom pt caution about the extent to which the concept can help us to understand 
contem porary processes o f  socio-political change there.
A: The Search for "Civil Society"
(i) A Serviceable Definition of Civil Society
There has already been a good num ber o f  theoretical discussions about the 
intellectual pedigree and different meanings o f  "civil society", both in the general 
literature o f  social and political theory and in recent scholarship on China by both 
W estern and Chinese scholars. 4 I shall spare the reader yet another one and 
concentrate rather on two main tasks: first, to distil the main ways in which the term is 
com m only understood in contem porary debate and, second, to use these m eanings to 
guide an empirical inquiry into socio-political processes in contem porary China.
One can detect two conceptions o f  "civil society" which are often used 
interchangeably and contribute to the confusion which surrounds the term: they could 
be called a sociological and a political conception. The first, sociological, conception is 
that o f  an interm ediate associational realm situated between the state on the one side 
and the building blocks o f  society on the other (individuals, families and firms), 
populated by social organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy some degree 
o f  autonom y from the state and are formed voluntarily by members o f  society to protect 
or extend their interests or values. The second, political, conception, which derives
from the Anglo-Am erican liberal tradition o f  political theory , equates civil society with 
"political society" in the sense o f  a particular set o f  institutionalised relationships 
between state and society based on the principles o f  citizenship, civil rights, 
representation and the rule o f  law. (Roberts 1987)
A good deal o f  the analysis o f  "civil society" in the Chinese context tends to run 
these two conceptions together by linking the emergence o f  "civil society" to pressures 
for (liberal) democratisation. 5 W hile there has been a clear historical relationship 
between these two processes in W estern contexts, there is no need at this stage to 
superimpose this experience on the Chinese case by identifying civil society only with 
those organisations which favour or facilitate democratisation. One inevitably ends up 
trawling through different types o f social organisation and trying decide which ones are 
truly "civil", in terms o f  their political proclivities, as opposed to those which are 
temporarily or permanently "uncivil", "pre-civil" or "non-civil". In the Chinese context 
as elsewhere, the sociological universe o f  "civil society" is very diverse. Rather than 
adopt a more narrow notion o f  civil society, based for example on Habermas or 
Rousseau, I prefer to begin the inquiry with a hopefully complementary approach 
which tries to come to terms with the current diversity o f  associational life rather than 
directing attention to just one sector or dimension o f  it. 6 This approach would also 
attempt to "delink" the concept o f "civil society" from any specific political or 
ideological tr adition, avoiding thereby the "risk o f  getting involved in an ideological or 
teleological exercise" which Gu Xin (1993-4: 52) rightly warns about. However, we 
should also be prepared for the prospect that the very term "civil society" might make 
such an exercise unavoidable.
Using the sociological approach in the first instance would give us access to a 
broader picture o f  the social forces which might hinder as well as foster 
democratisation. In work on other developing societies, distinctions have been made 
between different types or sectors o f  civil society: for example, between "modem" 
interest groups such as trade-unions or professional associations and "traditional" 
organisations based on kinship, ethnicity, culture or religion; between those 
organisations with specifically political roles and those which are either outside politics 
or only intermittently involved; between formal organisations and informal social 
networks based on patrimonial or clientelistic allegiances; between legal or open 
associations and secret or illegal organisations such as the Freemasons or the Mafia; 
and between associations which accept the political status quo and those which seek to 
transform it by changing the political regime or redefining the political comm unity (as 
in former Yugoslavia).
The relationship between the sociological and political conceptions o f  civil 
society then becomes a second-stage inquiry. The extent to which a specific civil 
society may or may not give rise to some kind o f  liberal-democratic political order is a 
fascinating area o f inquiry in itself and would deal with important political variables 
such as the formation o f  a politically influential "public opinion", the issue o f  
agreement between social elites on a coherent set o f  institutions and rules o f  the 
political game, the spread o f  a new political culture o f  citizenship and the 
institutionalisation o f  legal rights. One would expect that different categories o f  
associations would vary in their attitudes to the prospect o f  democratisation, ranging 
from support to indifference, opposition and subversion. A ny statement to the effect, 
for example, that a "strong" civil society is conducive to democratisation would be 
m eaningless unless one went further to identify the precise political character o f  a 
specific civil society. As Bayart (1986: p .l 18) has argued in the African context, "The 
advance o f  a civil society which does not necessarily contain the democratic ideal does 
not in itself ensure the democratisation o f  the political system". Conversely, the 
statement that a "weak" civil society is not conducive to democratisation is equally 
suspect: witness the case o f  the Soviet Union where the main thrust towards 
democratisation came from within the Party/state apparatus and not from the pressures 
o f  civil society. As Rueschemeyer and his colleagues have pointed out (1992), civil
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society is only one potential com ponent o f  the political impetus towards 
democratisation. The others, which may be decisive in certain instances, are 
international pressures and the influence o f  domestic state-based elites.
I shall mainly be using the sociological approach to civil society in this paper. 
My main purpose is to focus on changes in the organisational structure o f Chinese 
society: specifically to investigate the extent to which a new kind o f  intermediate 
stratum o f  social organisations has in fact emerged and changed the relationship 
between state and society. As evidence o f  "civil society", we would be looking for the 
developm ent o f  social organisations which demonstrate characteristics o f  spontaneity, 
voluntariness and self-regulation in their constitution and activities. To the extent that 
our inquiry does reveal the existence o f  this new sociological phenom enon, we can 
then go on to reflect, albeit som ewhat speculatively, about the political implications o f 
this new social realm as a force for dem ocratisation7
A m ethodological caveat. Although we are guided by a notion o f  "civil 
society" as an ideal type, we also recognise that any specific organisation in the real 
world may be only be a partial reflection o f  the ideal. M oreover, though the ideal type 
"civil society" does suppose a separation between it and the state, in the real world the 
two spheres overlap and interpenetrate to varying degrees.
(ii) I he Dual Dynamic of Civil Society in Post-Revolutionary China
W e are concentrating here on the developm ent o f  civil society during the era o f  
Chinese "market socialism" which began in 1978. To understand the formation o f  civil 
society during this period, it is necessary to set it within the broader dynam ics o f  state- 
society relations in the post-revolutionary period. From this longer term perspective 
one can identify a dual dynamic in the emergence of a civil society. The first is a 
political dynamic which reflects the impact o f  totalistic political institutions on a 
society and the political tensions and conflicts to which this gives rise. In this context, 
civil society characteristically takes the form o f  resistance to state control on the part o f  
organisations with explicitly political agendas. In context o f  the form er state socialist 
societies, the classic case o f this dynamic was that o f  Poland where Solidarity embodied 
a generalised political opposition to state control and waged a Gramscian "war o f  
position" against it. This civil society impetus takes a variety o f  forms: an 
organisational challenge to create new political institutions to replace or underm ine 
those o f  the ancien regime; an ideological challenge to the values o f  the M arxist- 
Leninist state religion m ounted by critical individuals and institutions; and a cultural 
challenge through the spread o f  heterodox patterns o f  social belief and behaviour in 
opposition to the official system o f  social morality.
The second dynamic o f  civil society is a market dynamic, analogous to the 
"Great Transform ation" wrought by the spread o f  market relations in W estern societies. 
(Polanyi 1957) In this context, civil society is a consequence o f  a separation between 
state and society resulting from the rise o f  a market econom y and the concomitant 
redistribution o f  social power away from the state to new strata which are thereby 
em pow ered to rein in and restructure the state. In the context o f  the form er state 
socialist countries o f  East/Central Europe, the only case o f  this dynam ic was that o f 
H ungary where the spread o f  a "second economy" in the 1970's and 1980's led to what 
Hungarian sociologists called a "second society", an associational sphere which was 
organised in ways radically different from and increasingly counter to the state. In the 
Chinese case, we can hypothesise that market reforms have brought about socio­
econom ic changes which have shifted the balance o f  pow er between state and society 
and reduced the capacity o f  the state to contr ol and m anipulate society. To the extent 
that these changes occur, they create the basis for a new sphere o f  social association 
which can be characterised as "civil society". This would imply a new relationship 
between social organisations and the state, moving away from a system o f  totalistic 
control to a more pluralistic one in which social organisations becom e more separate
and autonom ous, representing the interests o f  their social constituencies rather than the 
control imperatives o f  the state.
In the Chinese case, one can argue that the political dynamic of civil society 
has been in operation since the imposition o f  the Com m unist system of rule in the 
1950's. In retrospect, the organised upsurges which occurred during the 1 kindred 
Flowers M ovement o f  1956-1957 can be seen partially as the reactions o f  certain social 
groups against the imposition o f  the new system. In its early phases, the Cultural 
Revolution can also be seen in part as a political mobilisation o f  distinct social forces 
and interests against the Party/state, but operating within the ideological fram ework and 
institutional constraints o f  the Chinese Communist system at its "high" phase. The 
April 5 M ovement o f  1976 reflected widespread mass antagonism  to the political 
hegem ony o f  the radical left and the destructive political struggles o f  the previous 
decade and was based on the partially spontaneous mobilisation o f  popular social 
networks.^ The Democracy M ovement o f  1978-1979 exploited the weakened 
condition o f  the Com m unist Party/state after the traumas o f  the Cultural Revolution 
decade and represented the first signs o f  a political opposition with a radically different 
program me political reform comparable to its counterparts in East/Central Europe.
The distinct character o f  the post-1978 reform era is that, for the first time, both 
dynamics have been in operation. This era has its own complex political dynam ic o f  
civil society, the peaks being the student m ovem ent o f  1986 and the urban 
mobilisations o f  1989. 9 W hile the post-1979 era has seen oscillations in the degree o f  
political relaxation and control, the period as a whole has been one o f  relative political 
relaxation, characterised by a reduction in the degree o f  politicisation o f  everyday life 
and the expansion o f  areas o f  activity - cultural, economic and technical/professional - 
which are relatively free o f  political controls (when compared with the previous era o f  
M aoist "politics in command"). 10 At certain periods, particularly during 1988 and 
early 1989, the political atmosphere was relaxed to an extent which encouraged (and 
indeed almost prom ised to legitimate) the em ergence o f  social organisations o f  the civil 
society type, (for a review o f  this process, see He Baogang 1993: pp.4-6) However, 
these political fluctuations were taking place within a rapidly changing socio-econom ic 
context in which the market dynamic o f civil society was already well underway. W e 
thus need to think o f  the developm ent o f  civil society in the era o f  econom ic reform  as a 
complex interplay between these two socio-political dynamics. In the pre-reform  era. 
the Party/state ruled through a system o f  cellular encapsulation o f  society; in this 
institutional straitjacket, it was difficult for a political challenge from society to take 
organisational foim  and, if it did, the state retained the political wherewithal to repress 
it. However, when the logic o f  the command econom y begins to change and m em bers 
o f  society begin to assum e control over economic and social resources as a 
consequence o f  m arket reform, the capacity o f  the state to reimpose control through 
traditional institutional means begins to weaken.
Thus the political dynamic and the market dynamic o f  civil society are 
interactive and reinforcing. In particular, the latter impinges on the form er by 
weakening the ideological authority and organisational reach o f  the state, thereby 
reducing its generalised capacity to repress political alternatives. The institutions o f  
market society offer recruits, allies and resources to the political opposition and provide 
bolt-holes if  they fail. To the extent that the opposition offers political alternatives 
more conducive to the interests o f the new strata arising from an em ergent m arket 
order the two sets o f  forces may ally to organise a political offensive against the 
state .11
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B: The Impact of Economic Reform on State-Society Relations: the Rise of an 
Intermediate Sphere
(i) changes in state-society relations: the dual impetus
The social impact o f  the post-M ao economic reforms has been deep and 
accelerated in the nineties as China experienced a prolonged and unprecedented boom. 
The econom y has diversified in both sectoral and institutional terms, particularly 
through the rapid expansion o f  various non-state and foreign-invested enterprises. In 
consequence, Chinese society has becom e more complex and differentiated. New 
groups and strata have emerged with their own distinct interests: for instance, "new rich 
peasant” households in the rural areas, private and "collective" entrepreneurs in both 
cities and countryside and more independent m em bers o f  the "liberal professions". 
A lthough the vast proportion o f  the population have benefitted materially from the 
reforms, some have benefitted more than most and there is a widespread consciousness 
o f  grow ing inequalities, between regions and social strata. M easures to increase the 
autonom y o f  public enterprises, the rapid growth o f  the private and collective sectors 
and m easures to deregulate m arkets in labour and capital have resulted in a 
redistribution o f  pow er in society: away from Party/state institutions to public-sector 
m anagers, private/collective entrepreneurs, household enterprises and individuals able 
to sell their skills in the labour market.
Reforms in both industry and agriculture - notably the de facto privatisation o f  
agriculture in the early 1980's and the m ounting pressure on state enterprises to adapt to 
the dem ands o f  a market econom y - have weakened the key institutions which 
"encapsulated" the population in the pre-reform era - the "unit" in the cities and the 
"collective" in the countryside. M oreover, the previous control over population flows 
enforced through the system o f  household registration (hukou) was breaking down in 
the nineties. In consequence, Chinese society has becom e more fluid and dynam ic in 
both geographical and occupational terms. Urban workers have left their jobs in the 
public sector to start small businesses; officials and professionals have left their secure 
but increasingly unrew arding jobs on the governm ent payroll to seek their fortunes in 
the private or collective sectors (the phenomenon o f  "plunging into the sea"); peasants 
from rural hinterlands have left for local towns and cities creating a growing "floating 
population" existing within the interstices o f  urban life; people from poor regions have 
m oved within and between provinces in search o f  a better life; and young w orkers have 
been recruited to work in the Special Economic Zones and other open areas along the 
coast.
The social changes brought about by reform have also led to feelings o f  
insecurity and discontent among more vulnerable or disadvantaged sections o f  the 
population which has fuelled social unrest and instability, accom panied by a widely 
perceived decline in standards o f  public order and morality. In consequence, by the 
m id-1990's the Chinese state was facing a more volatile and assertive population and 
increasingly w idespread social unrest in both cities and countryside which threatened to 
reach critical proportions. 12
As we shall see below, these social changes and pressures have taken on 
organisational form as a wide variety o f  new forms o f  association have sprouted like 
bam boo after the rain. To this extent, one can talk o f  a powerful societal impetus 
towards the em ergence o f  civil society in the form o f  new types o f  intermediate 
association representing the interests and aspirations o f  evolving social forces and 
seeking greater autonom y from, and influence over, the Party/state. At the same time, 
however, there has been a powerful state impetus whereby political and governm ental 
institutions have sought to adjust to social change, ameliorate growing tensions 
between state and society, channel growing pressures for access and participation, and 
avert the political danger posed by a decline in govem ability and control.
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This state response is many-faceted and involves multifarious realignm ents and 
implicit deals between state institutions/officials and emergent social forces. 13 I wo 
aspects are particularly important for our inquiry: repression and incorporation. Certain 
organisational expressions o f  social opposition and unrest, particularly those resulting 
from the political dynamic o f  civil society, have been dealt with repressively, most 
dramatically in the Beijing M assacre on June 4 1989. As the conversations ol ( C P 
leaders published later reveal, they found the political challenge mounted by the 
demand from students and workers during this m ovem ent for voluntary and 
autonom ous organisations free from the controls conventionally exerted on "mass 
organisations" by the Party/state particularly threatening. For example, Li Peng is 
reported as having said that "If we recognise the 'College Students Autonom ous 
Federation 'just because the students insist on it, then we will be most likely to 
recognise a solidarity trade union if the workers insist on their demands, won't we?".
Yao Yilin allegedly added that "Peasants will establish peasants' organisations as well, 
then China will become another Poland. For this reason, we must never give in". 14 In 
this particular form, civil society levelled a rapier at the heart o f  the institutional logic o f 
M arxism-Leninism.
If we focus on the nature o f  the state response to the market impetus towards 
civil society, however, efforts at incorporation have been predominant. Implicitly or 
explicitly, the Party/state authorities have sought to establish a socialist form o f  state 
corporatism .' - The essential elements o f  corporatism  have been defined by Schmitter 
as follows:
"Corporatism can be defined as a system o f  interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into a limited num ber o f  singular, compulsory, non­
competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate m onopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their 
selection o f  leaders and articulation o f  dem ands and supports."
As we shall see below, the reform era has seen the emergence o f  a plethora o f  
"social organisations" (shehui tuanti), w hose establishment and relationship to state 
institutions em body the main elements o f  this corporatist pattern. M any o f  these, such 
as professional and academ ic associations, reflect the impact o f  a calculated political 
decision by the Dengist leadership to grant greater autonom y and recognition to 
professional expertise. M any reflect the process o f  sectoral differentiation in the 
economy and the rise o f  influential new economic forces such as individual, "new 
collective" and private business. The impetus towards corporatism has been haphazard 
and gradual. The first reaction to the challenge posed by new economic and 
occupational interests and the societal impetus towards their taking organisational form 
was the desire m erely to control and regulate. This was particularly apparent in the 
aftermath o f  the Tiananm en events when there was a hasty effort to identify, discipline 
and monitor social organisations through a system o f  compulsory registration 
administered by departments o f  Civil Affairs. It was not the case that these 
organisations had been independent or unregulated before; indeed m any if  not m ost had 
been established under the sponsorship o f  state institutions at different levels o f  
governm ent and had been subject to sectoral, ad hoc or localised forms o f  regulation. 
The post-Tiananm en impetus was to impose a universal, codified and centralised 
system o f  regulation and control, ultimately intended to take legal form. A ccordingly, a 
set o f  "Regulations Governing Registration and Administration o f  Social 
Organisations" was issued in October 1989. 16
The m ajor motive behind these Regulations was the desire to establish control 
over a potentially threatening social phenomenon, and in practice the registration 
process has operated as a powerful m echanism  o f  subordination and exclusion o f  
officially unacceptable forms o f  social organisation. However, another corporatist
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motive has gradually emerged which emphasises the complementarity between social 
organisations and the state as com ponents o f  a new system o f  socio-economic 
regulation. This idea, first articulated systematically by the economist Xue M uqiao in 
1988 (Xue 1988), argued that, in the economic sphere, social organisations could 
"serve as a bridge between the state and the enterprises" in a new form o f  "indirect" 
regulation and direction o f  the econom y which avoided both the previous deficiencies 
o f  Stalinist directive planning and the future dangers o f  anarchic markets. This idea has 
gained currency during the 1990's, particularly in the industrial sphere, as part o f  a 
general m ovem ent to "transfer the functions o f  governm ent organs" (zhuanbian 
zhengfu jiguande zhineng) whereby social organisations become in effect an 
intermediate level o f  economic governance. 1 / M ovement in this direction (notably 
the transform ation o f  certain central light industrial ministries into "general 
associations") has brought China to resemble the pattern o f  state-business relations 
characteristic o f  other East Asian economies, notably Japan and South Korea. Indeed. 
Japan has been cited a positive model for emulation by Chinese policy-makers.
The overall result o f  this dual impetus from both state and society is a social 
scene characterised by a wide variety o f  intermediate organisations which have 
developed along with and as a consequence o f  the Dengist reforms. These 
organisations have different types o f  relations with a Party/state machine which it itself 
undergoing institutional change in an effort to create a stable relationship with a rapidly 
changing and potentially threatening socio-econom ic environment. The puipose o f  the 
next section is to paint this social scene using a broad brush.
(ii) The "civil society" constellation
In contem porary China it is difficult to find an ideal-type "civil society" 
organisation which fully embodies the principles o f  voluntary participation, autonom y, 
separation from the state and self-regulation. Though organisations o f  this kind exist, 
they do so within the interstices or outside the realm o f  state controls. W ithin that 
realm, however, the principle o f  a fully autonom ous and self-regulating social 
organisation has not been formally recognised. W hile the official regulations for the 
registration o f  social organisations do go some way towards granting them an 
institutionalised status by recognising them as "legal persons" (faren), the registration 
procedures and conditions are highly restrictive and interpretation is still left to 
administrative discretion. All officially recognised organisations are thus, to a greater 
or lesser degree, controlled by and dependent on state institutions. Outside that realm, 
there are organisations which are excluded from official recognition yet live a limbo life 
o f  informal activity; there are organisations which, while disapproved o f  officially, are 
nonetheless tolerated or winked at by the authorities; and there are underground 
organisations subject to repression. Yet each o f  these categories o f  social organisation 
embodies, to varying degrees, the associational characteristics o f  "civil society". This 
partial and patchy "civil society" is made up o f  a complex and rapidly changing social 
constellation with m any layers and many different types o f  relationship with the 
Party/state.
If  we categorise these layers in terms o f  the nature o f  their relationship with the 
Party/state, the range is from caging, through (various degrees of) incorporation, to 
(more or less intermittent) toleration and repression. Let us discuss each category in 
terms o f  this gradation.
(a) the caged sector: the mass organisations The old-style "mass 
organisations" (qunzhong zuzhi) o f  the pre-reform era, namely the All-China 
Federation o f  Trade Unions (ACFTU), the W omen's Federation (WF) and the Young 
Com m unist League, had been subordinated to the Party as the three main "pillars" o f  its 
organised base o f  social control and support. As Leninist "transmission belts", they 
had virtually no organisational autonom y and any attempt to become more assertive, as 
in the case o f  the trade unions in the early and m id-1950’s, provoked a backlash from
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the Party. 18 However, the reform era's combination o f  limited political liberalisation 
and rapid socio-econom ic change provided opportunities and created pressures for 
these organisations to claim greater separation and independence from  the Party/state.
In the case o f  the trade-unions and the women's federation, this m ovem ent was 
visible in the few years before Tiananm en and began to reappear with growing force in 
the m id-1990's. In a detailed study o f  the ACFTU and the W F over the entire reform 
era. the author and his colleagues found that there was a m ounting impetus during the 
1980's on the part o f  both organisations to assert greater operational autonom y by 
distancing themselves from the Party and attempting to represent their social 
constituencies more effectively (White, Howell and Shang 1995: Chaps. 4-5).
How ever, the reassertion o f political controls after the Beijing M assacre led them to 
strike a Faustian bargain with the Party, whereby they sacrificed greater autonom y for 
greater access to and influence over official policy-making at both national and local 
levels. By the mid-1990's, however, the accelerated pace o f  economic reform was 
already unravelling this compact. The legitimacy and influence o f  both organisations 
were being underm ined, on the one side by the stresses and strains o f  the econom ic 
reform  process and its ambiguous impact on their m em berships, and on the other side 
by the increasingly debilitating constraints imposed by their continued dependence on 
the Party. Their dilemma was highlighted by the emergence o f  alternative 
organisations - illegal autonomous unions and workers' groups and informal wom en's 
groups - which could lay claim with much greater justification to the title o f real 
representatives o f  their members and organisational expressions o f  civil society in the 
full sense.
As for the YCL, it suffered a great loss o f  political influence and social appeal 
during the reform era because the Party no longer regarded it as the crucial channel o f  
political recruitment. M oreover, joining the Party was no longer the only way to make 
their way up in society, so the previous role o f  the YCL as a pathw ay to upward 
mobility was increasingly obsolete. M oreover, official policy encouraged the 
depoliticisation o f  youth and their involvement in activities - occupational, cultural and 
recreational - which they could increasingly obtain on the m arket and not through the 
good agencies o f the Party or the YCL. In a local study o f  the changing role o f  mass 
organisations in a small city in Zhejiang province, we found that the local YCL cadres 
felt that they had been abandoned by the Party; indeed they described them selves as 
"orphans". Their institutional response was to try to attract young people through 
cultural and recreational activities, since there was no longer any interest in politics, but 
they were finding it difficult since these things were available on the m arket and they 
lacked the financial resources in any case (which led them  to try to piggy-back on the 
local unions which had more money). 19 If  this case is a straw in the wind, one can 
hardly expect that the YCL has any future whatsoever.
The situation o f  these three mass organisations is different in that the trade- 
unions, unlike the W omen's Federation and the Y oung Com m unist League, has a 
guaranteed financial basis and an expanding constituency, particularly am ong workers 
in the burgeoning new collectives and foreign-invested enterprises who are becom ing 
increasingly aware o f  the need for union representation and protection. Yet the three 
organisations are similar in that each has pressing reasons to try to bend the bars o f  
Party control and establish themselves as more bona fide mass organisations. They are 
like birds which would like to escape from a cage and yet find it difficult not m erely 
because the bars o f  the cage are still strong but because they have becom e accustom ed 
to the advantages o f  cage life.
(b) the incorporated sector: the new social organisations A new  stratum o f  
officially recognised "social organisations" (shehui tuanti) has rapidly em erged at both 
national and local levels, including business and trade associations, professional 
associations, academ ic societies, sports, recreational and cultural clubs. Their num bers 
had already reached over 1,100 national and 100,000 regional/local ones by the time
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registration regulations were introduced in October 1989 and, though the rate o f  growth 
slowed in the clampdown after Tiananm en, their numbers began to grow again in the 
early 1990's. By late 1993 there were over 1,460 registered national social 
organisations, 19,600 at the provincial level and over 160,000 at the county level. 20
As the key element in an emerging corporatist sector, these organisations are 
am biguous and heterogeneous entities when viewed from a "civil society" perspective. 
Rather than constituting an associational sphere which embodies the growing pow er 
and assertiveness o f  social forces emerging from radical market reforms, they are an 
institutional terrain in which the interests and objectives both o f  increasingly influential 
social forces and o f  still powerful state institutions are interwoven. As such, they 
constitute a socially ambiguous institutional sphere which "braids" state and society in 
new and heterogeneous ways.
In spite o f  much misleading official vocabulary about their being "popular 
organisations" (minjian tuanti), closer inspection reveals a continuum  o f  different 
mixes between what one might call the state and the societal elem ent o f  each 
organisation. At one extreme, there are a minority o f organisations which are totally 
controlled by the governm ent (guanban) which are essentially extensions o f  the state 
machine. At the other extreme is a minority o f  organisations which are not considered 
im portant enough to be worth controlling on a continuing basis (usually recreational, 
academ ic or cultural groups). Most social organisations contained a mixture o f  both 
com ponents, roughly called sem i-govem m ental/ semi-popular (banguan banmin) 
Overall, as o f  1993 at least, when this research was conducted, the state com ponent was 
predom inant within this m ix.21
In practice, the state component implied not only the need for each social 
organisation to obtain formal approval by registering with the appropriate department 
o f  Civil Affairs, but also the requirem ent to "link up" (guakao or guikou) with a 
specific governm ent agency which acted as its "superior department" or official 
sp o n s o r .^  M oreover, a social organisation might receive all or part o f  its finances 
from the state, and one or m ore o f  its key leaders might be appointed by the "linked" 
state agency which might also require it to carry out certain official "tasks".
Conversely, the extent to which an organisation was self-financing, chose its own 
leaders and organised its own activities according to the wishes and interests o f  its 
m em bers were indices o f  its societal or "popular" character. However, the "popular" 
dimension o f  a social organisation is reduced because o f  the official requirem ent - a 
central feature o f  corporatism - that only one organisation is allowed to represent each 
social group or economic sector within a given administrative area. So in any locality 
there will be one Private Enterprises Association, one Individual Businesspeople's 
A ssociation, one Calligraphy Association, one Lawyers' Association, one Accountants 
Association and so on.
As studies o f  corporatism elsewhere have revealed, corporatist systems are hard 
to m aintain and this intermediate sphere, which He Baogang calls "semi-civil society", 
is in flux and ridden with tensions. There is a constant tension between the regulations 
and the reality o f  social organisations as the latter acts to m ake the former obsolescent. 
For exam ple, the requirem ent that there should be only one association o f  its kind in 
each area is often challenged. One local case in point was the contest for formal 
recognition by two competing associations o f  accountants in the north-eastern city o f  
Shenyang being. At the national level, there was a similar competition between 
calligraphy associations which had to be solved by negotiation and merger. However, 
official regulations are applied "flexibly" at local levels, with local governm ents 
seeking to increase their freedom o f  m anoeuvre as part o f  an effort to establish local 
corporatist systems involving collaboration between governm ent agencies and local 
socio-econom ic interests, organised in the associations, to promote focal developm ent.
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M oreover, the official policy o f  "transferring governm ent functions" in the mid- 
1980's has led governm ents at all levels to think o f  ways in which form er governm ent 
activities could be transferred to associations as part o f  a semi-privatisation of 
governance. This role o f  associational governance has increasingly been built into law. 
For example, the law on "Protecting Consumers' Rights and Interests", prom ulgated in 
October 1993, contained a chapter defining the role o f  consumers' associations in 
"supervising com m odities and services and protecting consumers' legitimate rights and 
interests". Similar provisions were made in the law on registered accountants issued at 
the same tim e.23 At the same time, governm ents faced by severe fiscal constraints are 
also trying to reduce the burden o f  supporting social organisations, prompting the latter 
to make an effort to find their own finance and becom e more autonom ous as a m atter o f  
institutional survival. This involves setting up their own businesses, exploiting any real 
estate at their disposal and providing paid sendees to their members. This in turn 
prompts them to be m ore sensitive to the needs and interests o f  their own social 
constituencies and, because less dependent on the state, less beholden to it.
At the same time as the direct role o f  governm ent gradually recedes, m oreover, 
the pow er o f  social interests is increasing, a phenom enon particularly visible in the 
spheres o f  private business and the professions. The rising role o f  trade associations is 
visible, particularly in the localities, in both the urban and rural areas. These can 
provide tangible benefits to their members in terms o f  access to state agencies, market 
information and promotion, business contacts, prevention o f  "unfair" competition, 
establishment and monitoring o f  standards, technical sendees, and the like. The rising 
pow er o f the liberal professions is also visible: for example, lawyers are increasingly 
m oving out o f  governm ent sendee to establish their own private partnerships and the 
num ber o f  lawyers is expected to double (to 100,000) by the year 2000. Private 
medicine and education are also expanding rapidly. 24 Semi-official and private 
new spapers and journals have also proliferated over recent years, outrunning the 
capacity o f  the state to control and regulate them, and journalists have becom e 
increasingly vocal in agitating for greater freedom and legal protection. 25
All o f  these trends may be gradually shifting the balance within social 
organisations away from the state to the society com ponent and converting them  into 
associations o f  a more "civil" nature. This operates directly through exerting pressures 
within the organisations themselves and indirectly through the threat or reality o f  
alternative organisations arising to challenge their m onopoly. It is to this "counter­
world" o f  alternative organisations that we turn in the next two sections.
(c) the interstitial "limbo" world of civil society:
Particularly during the period leading up to Tiananm en and the early-m id 
1990's when the pace o f  economic reform accelerated, there has been a rapid growth o f  
urban associations which have either not achieved formal official recognition or have 
achieved it through connections with sympathetic agencies or individuals. One 
dram atic example was the growth o f  "salons" o f  intellectuals in 1988-1989 which 
provided much o f  the thought and some o f  the organisational initiative behind the 
social mobilisation o f  early 1989. These operated through informal connections and 
m eetings and intermittently through formal public events such as conferences and 
seminars. In the early 1990's, this form o f  informal association took a less explicitly 
political form, and operated through an increasingly dense system o f  netw orks o f  
likeminded people (such as journalists, artists, rock musicians, hom osexuals, artists, 
martial arts specialists), often focussing on specific locations such as clubs, karaoke 
parlours, dancehalls and bars as well as private homes. One particular area o f  
expansion, for example, was that o f women's groups. Some o f  these have found shelter 
as "second-level associations" under the formal auspices o f  an officially recognised 
social organisation (for example, the W omen Journalists Association, the W omen 
Entrepreneurs Association or the W omen M ayors Association). Some o f  these have 
also been encouraged and protected by the official W om en's Federation. But the early
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1990's have also seen the emergence o f  informal, unrecognised wom en's groups 
without official sponsors, small salons which meet to discuss issues specific to women. 
26
Other associations include those in formation, which are intending to seek 
official recognition, those that are having difficulty obtaining registration and those that 
have failed the registration procedure. One example at the national level, observed in 
1993, was the Green China Association, a small association devoted to environm ental 
issues; at the local level, the W omen W riters' Small Group in Xiaoshan city in Zhejiang 
province was in existence as o f  the time o f  our interview in mid 1991, but had not yet 
registered because o f  a fear on the part o f  the municipal W omen's Federation that it 
would not pass the registration procedures.
On the urban scene, the growth o f  this interstitial world o f  semi-formal and 
informal forms o f  association was becoming denser in the mid-1990's, fostered by the 
social space and opportunities opened up by the breakneck pace o f  economic 
transform ation during this period. Although this sphere is subject to periodic 
harassm ent, one can argue that the trend is becoming irreversible. A lthough much o f  
this organisational activity takes non-political forms, yet (as in the case o f  cultural 
organisations before Tiananm en), it can become rapidly politicised in conducive 
circum stances and could form part o f  the basis for a repeated organisational upsurge 
along the lines o f  1989. The key role in its expansion is being played by m em bers o f  
the intelligentsia and emergent professional strata, groups whose potential social 
influence is increasing as they become more integrated with the world o f  business 
through their growing propensity to "plunge into the sea" o f  comm erce and i n d u s t r y .27
W hile the above phenom ena would be characteristic o f  cities and larger towns, 
the rural areas have also seen a proliferation o f  semi-formal and informal associations 
throughout the reform  era. These include traditional organisations based on lineage and 
clan, or ethnic group; Buddhist and Daoist religious groups based on existing, 
reconstructed and new temples and shrines; informal local "cliques" and brotherhoods; 
and local-place associations (tongxianghui), some o f  which have been transplanted to 
the cities where they provide an organisational basis for rural migrants.28
Some o f  these phenom ena have caused concern to the local authorities: for 
exam ple, when disputes between single-clan villages have led to arm ed fights between 
them; 29 when traditional religious practices have interfered with state policies (such as 
that o f  encouraging cremation over burial); or where local "cliques" and brotherhoods 
have becom e involved with gambling and other forms o f  crime. However, it is very 
com m on for local authorities, including Party officials, either to wink at the resurgence 
o f  these pre-revolutionary forms o f  association, or actively to support and even 
participate in them. Local officials may use these ties to strengthen their own authority 
and build up their locality. For example, Party officials in M oslem areas m ay promote 
religious revival to gain preferential policies from the state or to encourage potentially 
lucrative contacts with Islamic countries in the M iddle East. Entrepreneurial local 
officials in coastal provinces with large migrant populations overseas use tongxianghui 
to encourage business contacts and attract capital from overseas C h i n e s e .20 These pre­
revolutionary forms o f  social association do constitute a growing organisational sphere 
which em bodies the basic characteristics o f  "civil society". However, as in the case o f  
urban social organisations, the relationships between them and the local state varies a 
great deal, ranging from mutual suspicion and uneasy co-existence to active 
cooperation and mutual support.
(d) the suppressed sector: underground civil society
This sector o f  civil society is highly diverse, including a wide variety o f  political 
and social organisations as well as secret societies and other criminal organisations.
The degree o f  official repression varies. In some case, it involves m onitoring with
repression kept as an option in reserve. A docum ent reportedly issued by the CCP in 
m id-1992, for example, drew attention to the rise o f  "spontaneous mass organisations 
which were neither officially reported to nor sanctioned by governm ent organs" which 
required close surveillance. These included organisations such as the All-China 
Qigong Association, the National Alliance o f  Demobilised Servicemen o f  the Rural 
Areas, the Association o f  Urban Unem ployed and the Association o f  Individual 
Households. W hile these kinds o f  organisation do not pose an explicit threat to the 
regime, they are perceived as potentially threatening because they have been organised 
independently and em body groups which could potentially cause trouble (notably 
demobilised soldiers who "have a long histoiy o f  self-organisation, going back to the 
Hundred Flowers M ovement). 31
Other organisations are classified as hostile agencies and are rigorously 
suppressed. M any o f  these are the heritage o f  the repression o f  June 4th. and its 
aftermath, when governm ents in Beijing and other cities took steps to identify and 
suppress organisations involved in the m obilisations o f  early-mid 1989.32 However, 
there was already an accumulation o f  banned organisations before 1989 and others 
have appeared since. An internal docum ent issued by the M inistry o f  Public Security 
in 1993 and leaked in the Hong Kong press, reported that, over the period from June 
1986 to Septem ber 1992, the public security forces had banned 1,370 "illegal 
organisations o f  all kinds” and a further 69 had either voluntarily disbanded or 
surrendered to the police. In spite o f  these measures, however, the docum ent reported 
that illegal organisations were still spreading "like a prairie fire". It directed particular 
attention to 62 "hostile forces opposing the socialist system", which included political 
and social organisations from the 1989 Dem ocracy M ovement (such as the National 
Autonom ous Federation o f W orkers), and assorted "ultra-leftist reactionary" 
organisations, relics o f the Maoist period, with names such as the Defend M aoZedong 
Doctrine Alliance and the Jiangxi Red Uprising Column. The list also included 
regional/ethnic organisations such as the Xinjiang Justice Party and the Independent 
Party o f  Inner M ongolia and religious organisations such as the China Christian 
Association and China Catholic Association.33
Religious sentiment spread rapidly in the early-mid 1990's in both urban and 
rural areas. Public opinion surveys reported an upsurge o f  interest in religion, 
particularly am ong young people. Religious organisations have proliferated in the 
early-mid 1990's - Christian, Islamic, Buddhist and Daoist - and the authorities 
responded with a mixture o f  repression, toleration and attempts to incorporate them  into 
the officially recognised religious bodies. They have tried to crack down on 
"spontaneous churches", with limited success. 34 Regional policies towards grass-roots 
religious organisations have varied significantly, with authorities in G uangdong 
apparently showing more tolerance while other provinces such as Sichuan have been 
more repressive.35
There has apparently been a comparably rapid spread o f  secret societies and 
other criminal fraternities and gangs. A  circular reportedly issued by the M inistry o f  
Public Security in 1992 claimed that there were over 1,830 underw orld organisations o f  
various types, some o f  them having as m any as 30,000 m em bers and operating not only 
across regions but also internationally, particularly through cooperation with Triad 
organisations in Hong K ong.36 These organisations are regarded as dangerous not 
m erely because o f  their characteristic involvement in vice and crime, but also because 
o f  their overseas connections and their sporadic political involvements (for exam ple, in 
smuggling D em ocracy M ovement activists out o f  China after June 4).
In general, illegal organisations have spread rapidly in the early-mid 1990's and 
have clearly outrun the capacity or the inclination o f  the authorities to control them. 
W hile some o f  them, such as the criminal secret societies would be illegal under any 
form o f  political system, and some, such as rem nant "ultra-leftist" and Dem ocracy 
M ovem ent organisations, represent a clear political challenge, the vast m ajority
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represent the associational urges o f  a rapidly changing society which is increasingly 
restless and resentful o f restrictions. The regime faces a Catch 22 situation: suppression 
is increasingly unfeasible and, even where effective, is often counter-productive; 
toleration will allow a widening range o f  organisations to increase their influence and 
exert stronger pressures for official recognition, thereby undermining the Party/state's 
capacity to maintain its institutional monopoly over society. This Catch 22 provides a 
powerful political dynamic towards not only the formation o f  civil society in terms o f  
new  social organisations, but also towards pressuring the authorities to change the 
political framework to provide some form o f  institutionalised guarantees for their 
existence and operational autonomy. How this might come about is one subject o f  our 
concluding section.
C: CONCLUSIONS: THE NATURE OF CHINESE CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS 
IM PLICATIONS FOR DEM OCRATISATION
(i) the utility of the concept of "civil society"
Using the sociological definition o "civil society" advanced at the beginning o f  
this chapter, one can argue strongly that there is a strong and growing intermediate 
sphere o f  social association in China which embodies, in different ways and to differing 
degrees, the basic characteristics o f  a "civil society" - those o f  voluntary participation, 
self-regulation and separation from the state. It is equally true that this organisational 
realm is partial and incipient in the sense that very few o f  the organisations described 
em body these characteristics to the full, nor do they operate in a political context which 
guarantees them  the right to do so. This emergent associational universe is very 
diverse, containing sectors which are both "traditional" and "m odem ",37 urban and 
rural, national and grass-roots, political and non-political, progressive and reactionary, 
liberal and ultra-leftist, open and underground. They also vary widely in the types o f 
relationship they have with the Party/state, ranging from the caged and incorporated 
sectors - the "mass organisations" and the new-style "social organisation" - through the 
interstitial, tolerated and monitored, to the suppressed. There is a kind o f  "core­
periphery" arrangem ent with a relatively well-integrated core o f  caged and incorporated 
associations at the centre and a large and rapidly growing periphery o f  associations 
which are relatively fragmented and are kept so by the intervention o f  the Party/state.
Yet this sociological conception o f  civil society has its limitations. It tends to 
provide static "snapshots" o f  this complex social constellation and blind us to important 
elem ents o f  the reality. As a structural analysis, it tends to privilege formal association 
and needs to be set within the powerful social texturing o f  informal connections and 
netw orks which provides the underlying weave o f  Chinese social relationships across 
both state and society. It also needs to be related more explicitly to the changing nature 
o f  its basic institutional building blocks, particularly the traditional danwei, the new 
enterprises o f  the private, collective and joint-venture sectors and the proliferation o f  
m ass m edia.38
Yet to understand the developm ent o f  civil society in contem porary China, we 
need to go beyond a structural analysis to investigate the dynamics o f  the process, as 
suggested in our initial distinction between the political and the market dynamics o f  
civil society. The shifting constellation o f  intermediate associational life described 
above reflects the operation o f  both. The market dynamic opens up socio-economic 
space, endows social actors with resources and to power to use them; and makes state 
control over the socio-econom ic system more difficult. The political dynamic, 
operating in different ways according to the specific nature o f  the relationship between 
each sector or layer o f  social organisation and the state, draws strength from the social 
changes wrought by the market, operates within the increasing space created thereby 
and takes advantage o f  the diminishing capacities o f  the state to expand it still further. 
Each layer has its own dynamic: the balance o f  pow er within the incorporated layer is 
shifting gradually in favour o f  the societal component while the illegal layer is
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worrying away at and weakening the coercive capacities o f  the Party/state. I liese 
m ovem ents suggest the image o f  tectonic plates shifting before an earth tremor.
In their different ways, these two dynam ics are m oving in a direction which 
presages m ajor changes in the balance o f  pow er and the nature o f  the relationship 
between state and society in contemporary' China. The Party/state's coping strategy - a 
combination o f  incorporation and repression - has channelled and staunched the rise ol 
organised society, but was increasingly problem atic as the pace o f  socio-econom ic 
change accelerated in the mid-1990's. As pressures from below have m ounted yet not 
found adequate channels for expression and the tension between state and society has 
increased in consequence, the force o f  incipient civil society has increasingly taken on 
the form o f  spontaneous and sporadic bursts o f  activity - dem onstrations, riots, protests, 
sit-ins, beatings and fights - in both urban and rural areas. 1 his can itself be seen as an 
index o f  the lack o f  a fully institutionalised civil society in which organisations have the 
ability not merely to form and operate autonom ously, but have the legally guaranteed 
right to represent the interests and concerns o f  their constituencies to the authorities.
The image o f  a boiler building up a dangerous level o f  steam pressure is an apt one.
The dynamic o f  civil society in China is taking on the dim ensions o f  an 
increasingly generalised contestation between state and society. Indeed, the intellectual 
paradigm  o f  "civil society" owes much o f  its influence to the fact that it is an effective 
way to interpret this struggle for both analysts and practitioners alike. It is this very fact 
that "civil society" is an idea rooted in real political struggles which gives it its force but 
weakens its usefulness as a scientific concept. I f  we try to render the term serviceable 
as a social scientific concept, we drain it o f  its meaning. If we try to define it purely in 
sociological terms, the term becomes otiose and the social phenom ena it refers to can 
equally well be labelled by some anodyne phrase such as "interm ediate associations".
The sociological and political conceptions o f  "civil society" are in fact 
inextricable. W hether we approve or it or not, the very use o f  the term  "civil society" 
involves us in an analytical exercise which m ay be both ethnocentric (qua rooted in 
expectations derived from the Western experience o f  civil society) and teleological 
(qua positing certain political consequences o f  a market econom y and an intermediate 
associational sphere) As such, the idea has a heuristic value; rather than beating our 
breasts about ethnocentrism or teleology, it is worth em barking on an analysis o f  the 
politics o f  civil society, but with the awareness that our usual political expectations 
about the em ergence o f  an intermediate associational sphere m ay be wrong or only 
partly right when applied to China.
(ii) Civil society and political change
W ith this methodological caveat in mind, let us move to a discussion o f  the 
question we raised at the outset - the relationship between the rise o f  civil society as a 
sociological entity and the constitution o f  civil society as a political fram ew ork which 
legitimises the free operations o f  social associations through the rule o f  law and 
guaranteed civil and political rights (essentially some form o f  liberal dem ocracy). Our 
analysis suggests that political change, when it comes, is likely to be an outcom e o f  an 
increasingly intense and generalised struggle in an increasingly com plex and 
conflictual society. This could lead in the direction o f  chaos and collapse rather than 
orderly transition to an alternative form o f  political society. Com m onsense and 
comparative experience suggests that the latter transition - a process o f  political 
liberalisation or democratisation - can only be successfully achieved through political 
accom modation and agreement between key sets o f  political actors.39 This partly 
depends on the availability o f  a reform leadership within the CCP which is willing to 
read the writing on the wall and come to terms with new socio-political forces through 
policy concessions and institutional changes. However, it also depends on the ability o f  
influential social forces to come together and agree on the desirability o f  new  political 
arrangements. This implies a capacity for social forces to play a constitutive role by
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redefining the rules o f  the political game and underpinning their consolidation. 
Przeworski (1991: p.26) emphasises this point when he argues that "dem ocracy is 
consolidated when compliance - acting within the institutional framework - constitutes 
the equilibrium  o f  the decentralised strategies o f  all the relevant political forces".
However, the current character o f  China's incipient civil society makes such a 
smooth transition problematic because it is so diverse, fragmented and potentially 
anarchic. For example, while some o f  the underground political organisations may be 
in favour o f  liberal democracy, others advocate a return to Maoist politics or, in the 
case o f  ethnic separatist organisations, a break-up o f  the existing political community. 
M oreover, certain key potential counter-elites - most notably the new entrepreneurial 
class - have shown little interest in the prospect o f  radical political change because their 
interests are bound up with the stability o f  the current process o f  market reform under 
the auspices o f  an authoritarian regime with which they are deeply i n t e r m e s h e d .40 in 
general, as W ang Shaoguang (1991) has pointed out, civil societies in general - and 
Chinese civil society in particular - are riven by conflicts and inequalities and have a 
potential for a wide variety o f  different types o f  politics, o f  which democracy is but 
one. The tendency towards idealisation, which pervades much o f  the intellectual and 
political discourse on civil society, must be resisted.
The ideological climate among political reformers in China has indeed moved 
in a more sober and conservative direction over recent years. After the radical political 
fervour o f  Tiananm en died away, there has been a gradually growing consensus that, if 
a process o f  political liberalisation and democratisation is to take place, it should be a 
gradual, m anaged process. This does not merely represent the desire o f  political elites 
either to cling to their power or go out gracefully (or at least comfortably). To a 
considerable extent it also represents the fears and conflicts o f  China's incipient civil 
society: the new entrepreneurial class worries that radical political change might lead to 
instability, mass rule or a recalcitrant labour force; the industrial working class fears 
that it m ight lead to a rapid erosion o f  its relatively privileged position in society, and 
greater insecurity and exploitation by capital; intellectuals fear that it could either lead 
to chaos or rule by an illiterate numerical majority. Paradoxically, considerations o f 
this kind lead one to suspect that civil society in its current form may be an obstacle 
rather than an impetus to democratisation and that, like the Soviet precedent, a 
successful political transition, if indeed it can be achieved, will need to be sponsored 
and organised by reformist elements within the current political elite.
LENGTH: 10,111 words (including references and footnotes)
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1 For a recent exam ple of the latter, see I’aul Hirst (1994) w ho argues the case for "associative 
dem ocracy". For a valuable review o f  the "civil society argument" by a U nited States political theorist 
advocating "critical associationalism ", see W alzer(1992)
2 For a review  o f  the role played by civil society in Eastern Europe and o ther com m unist countries in 
the 1980’s, see M iller (1992).
3 I have d iscussed the relationship betw een civil society and dem ocratisation in developing countries in 
W hite (1994).
4 A recent review  by M a (1994) contains references on most o f  the relevant theoretical discussions as 
w ell as providing a useful overview  o f  the view s o f  Chinese intellectuals. G u (1993-94) provides a 
valuable overview  and assessm ent o f  the debates over "civil society" and the "public sphere" in W estern 
w ork on China.
5 For an exam ple o f  this approach, see W hyte 1992.
6 1'he use o f  m ore theoretically focussed approaches can also prove valuable in throw ing light on the 
political dynam ics o f  the reform era: for example, Sullivan's use o f  a Rousseauian approach (1990) and 
the debate about the applicability o f  H aberm as' notion o f  the "public sphere" in the special edition o f  the 
m agazine M odern  C hina edited by Philip Huang (1993).
7 T his article draw s on the findings o f  a collective research project (also involving Jude Howell and 
Shang X iaoyuan) w hich investigated the market dynam ic o f  civil society through fieldwork in C hina 
during 1991-93. T he research focussed prim arily on the urban sector and on tw o types o f  organisations - 
official "m ass organisations" and new -style "social organisations". O ur w ork on these tw o types o f 
organisation  has enabled us to com e to  a judgem ent about the analytical value o f  the civil society 
approach and has also led to a prelim inary m apping o f  the broader constellation o f  associational life in 
contem porary C hina, pointing out directions for future research. For an analysis o f  our research findings 
by  one o f  the team , see Howell 1994.
8 For an excellent analysis o f  the social dynam ics o f  this m ovem ent, see H eilm ann 1993-94.
9 For analyses o f  the rise o f  "civil society" in the D em ocracy M ovem ent o f  early-m id 1989, see 
O stergaard  1989 and G old 1990. For a skeptical v iew  about the significance o f  "civil society" in 1989, 
see W alder 1989a).
10 O ver the entire post-revolutionary period, the political dynam ic o f  civil society m obilisation has an 
am biguous relationship w ith the oscillation betw een periods o f  political control ( shou) and relaxation 
(fang) w hich  has characterised relations betw een state and society in post-revolutionary China. Some 
upsurges have com e about as a response to  prolonged periods o f  shou (the 1976 April Fifth M ovem ent, 
for exam ple) w hile others have been stim ulated by periods o f  fang (notably during the H undred Flow ers 
M ovem ent in  1956-57 and the D em ocracy M ovem ent in 1978-79). The reform era itse lf has its ow n 
oscillations betw een shou and fang: for an overview  o f  the dynam ics o f  shou and fang, see G old  1990.
11 T hough there w ere elem ents o f  this alliance during the mobilisation o f  1989, they w ere still fairly 
inchoate. H ow ever, the continuing spread o f  market relations lays the fundations for a repetition, in 
m uch stronger form, o f  this alliance in som e future context o f  political turmoil.
12 D uring 1993 and 1994, w arnings about m ounting social unrest w ere m ounting on all sides. For one 
account from an official youth journal, for exam ple, see Liu Dafu, "The key to  unshakeablencss for 100
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years is unshakeableness for 10 years", Z hongguo Q ingnian (C hinese Y outh), n o .l, 1993, excerpts of 
w hich are translated in BBC, Sum m ary o f  W orld Broadcasts: Far Fast (hereafter SW B :F K ), 1668.
13 T o understand the shifting patterns o f  accom m odation and adjustm ent betw een state 
institutions/officials and social forces/interests, w e w ould need to  trace both the dynam ics o f  econom ic 
and cultural policy and the form ation o f  informal netw orks linking the denizens o f  state and society 
along lines o f  com m on interest.
14 For an account published by the Hongkong press, see Lin M usen, "A C CP docum ent reatfirm s the 
T iananm en m assacre", C heng M ing, 1 February 1992, in S W B :F F , 1305. O ther, m ore reform ist, C C P 
leaders such as W an Li w ere allegedly m ore sym pathetic to  the idea o f  autonom ous student organisations 
in 1989: for exam ple, see 1.0 Ping, "W an Li on the June 4 Ix sson" , C heng M ing, 1 June 1993, pp. 12- 
13, in SW B :F E , 1706.
15 For a thoughtful application o f  the notion o f  corporatism  to contem porary China, sec U nger and 
C han 1993.
16 A text o f  the R egulations w as published in R enm in R ibao (People's Daily) on 9 N ovem ber 1989 
and is translated in SW B :F E  0621.
17 For a com prehensive report on the changing functions o f  industrial trade associations prepared  by the 
Industrial Econom ics A ssociation, see "Fully affirm the im portant status o f  industrial trade associations 
in a socialist m arket econom ic system ", published in the journal o f  the C hinese C onstruction Industry 
A ssociation, Jiancunhui Bao (C onstruction A ssociation N ew s), no. 6, 1993.
18 For an account o f  the fluctuations in the status o f  the trade-unions in the pre-Cultural Revolution 
period, see H arper 1969.
19 For a detailed analysis o f  this local case-study, see W hite 1993.
20 For these statistics, see "N ew  regulations for registering social organisations", X inhua (N ew  C hina
N ew s A gency), 31 O ctober 1989 and an interview  w ith officials o f  the Social O rganisations 
M anagem ent O ffice, the M inistry  o f  Civil Affairs, Beijing, in O ctober 1993.
21 For a detailed description and analysis o f  "social organisations", see W hite, I low ell and Shang 
(forthcom ing: chap.2).
22 If  a social organisation is unable to  secure an official organisation as sponsor, it is prevented  from 
registering. For exam ple, in the city o f  Shenyang, the Football Fans A ssociation w as unable to get the 
local Sports A ssociation to sponsor its application for official recognition.
23 For English texts o f  these law s, w hich w ere adopted by a m eeting o f  the N ational People's C ongress 
S tanding C om m ittee on 31 O ctober 1993, see S W B :F E  0308 and 0309.
24 For a report on the expansion o f  private schools in Beijing, for exam ple, see the report in X inhua  
(N ew  C hina N ew s A gency), 23 M arch 1994, in S W B :F E , 1984.
25 For a report on the dem and for legal protection by law yers in G uangdong province, see Lian He 
Bao, H ongkong, 10 D ecem ber 1993, in SW B :F E , 1872.
26 For m ore detail on these groups, see W hite, Howell and Shang (1995), C hap .5.
27 For analyses o f  the relationship betw een intellectuals and the em ergence o f  this new  associational
sphere, see K elly and H e (1992) and Bonnin and C hevrier (1991).
28 In Beijing, for exam ple, a num ber o f  new  "villages" have appeared, housing part, o f  the city's 
estim ated 1.5 m illion "floating population". They have nam es such as "X injiang V illage", "Z hejiang
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Village" and "H enan Village" based on the regional origins o f  the m igrants living there. ( X inhua, 14 
July 1993).
29 For exam ple, an official in the Judicial Departm ent o f  the Zengcheng county governm ent in 
G uangdong province, interview ed in M arch 1994, adm itted that fights betw een single-clan villages 
posed a threat to public order in the county.
39 T his practice w as recently observed by the author during a field-visit to  Zengcheng county in 
G uangdong province in M arch-April 1994.
31 Y ang Po, "C C P takes strict precautions against 'rebellion' by non-governm ental m ass organisations", 
C heng M ing, 8 June 1992, in SW B :F E , 1409.
32 For a valuable survey o f  these organisations, see W alder (n.d.).
33 "O n eases o f  underground illegal organisations cracked and banned or surrendering them selves to the 
police over recent years", reported in C heng M ing, Hongkong, 1 January 1993, in S W B :F E , 1581.
34 For attem pts to  control national-level religious organisations, see Lu Y u s h a ," T ension in spring - 
utm ost 'solicitude' is show n for national churches", T angtai, Hongkong, 15 June 1994, in S W B :F E , 
2028.
35 For the S ichuan case, see Z hongguo X inw enshc (China N ew s A gency), Beijing, 25 M arch 1993 (in 
S W B :F E , 1964) w hich reports a change o f  policy in the direction o f  religious liberalisation after a 
decade o f  conflict and repression.
36 "C ircular on R esolutely Banning and C racking D ow n on the O rganisations and A ctivities o f  Secret 
Societies", reported in C heng M ing, H ongkong, 1 M ay 1992, in SW B :F E , 1385.
37 T he m ention  o f  "traditional" and "m odem  raises the usual question about the extent to  w hich 
currently  em ergent civil society  represents som ething new  or a resurgence o f  pre-revolutionary social 
forms. Som e o f  the new  organisations em erging in the countryside seem  to be clear exam ples o f  
resurgence, though som e o f  them  are being used for new purposes. M oreover, the incorporated sector o f 
"social organisations", m arking an interpenetration o f  the realms o f state and society, is redolent o f  the 
"third realm " w hich H uang (1993) holds to  be aperdu ring  characteristic o f  C hinese social structure. This 
w riter is skeptical o f  both the notion and the reality o f  the "third realm", but a  proper discussion o f  this 
thesis is beyond the bounds o f  this paper. For a review  o f  different scholarly positions on the issue o f  
historical continuity, see G u (1993-94: 42-47).
38 The danw ei w as an im portant m atrix o f  social m obilisation both for the April 5th. M ovem ent o f  1976 
and the D em ocracy M ovem ent o f  1989. For the changing nature o f  the danw ei, see Hebei and Schucher 
1991 and num erous p ieces by  A ndrew  W alder (for exam ple 1989). For a thought-provoking analysis o f
a collective enterprise as part o f  an em ergent civil society, analogous to m y analysis o f  the dual character 
o f  the incorporated new -style "social organisations", see Y ang 1989.
M any authors rem ind us, m oreover, o f  the crucial role o f  social and political anim ateur played 
by  certain com panies (notably the Stone Corporation) and research institutions in the pre-Tiananm en 
m obilisation (for exam ple, W hyte 1992 and He 1993).
39 For com parative experience on the political dynam ics o f  dem ocratic transitions, see O 'D onnell, 
Schm itter and W hitehead 1986 and Huntington 1991.
40 T his point is m ade cogently by Solinger (1992).
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